Norwegian solidarity with the liberation of Southern Africa

By Nina Drolsum Kroglund

 

 

The struggle for liberation in southern Africa, and especially from the apartheid regime in South Africa has been an important issue in Norwegian politics and in the Norwegian society as a whole. Happenings inside South Africa and the other southern African countries, such as the Sharpeville massacre, the liberation of the Portuguese colonies, the Soweto upraising and the intensified oppression of the apartheid regime in the eighties, provided increasing support and political response from the Norwegian authorities.[1]

 

The Norwegian anti-apartheid movement can be divided in many different fractions, and saw its beginnings in the late 1950s. In this chapter I will give a brief overview of the broadness and the main achievements of the Norwegian anti-apartheid movement, as well as of the Norwegian official political support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

 

The sympathy with the freedom struggle in southern Africa, and especially in South Africa, could be found in all social stratums of the people, from all political parties, from nurses and teachers to bank clerks and industrial leaders, and from school children to pensioned members of Parliament. The words of F.W. de Klerk in his autobiography is descriptive of what happened:

“The fact is that for almost four decades South Africa had been a central preoccupation of the Norwegians. Whole generations of Norwegian schoolchildren had been raised on the premise that apartheid was the apotheosis of all evil and that Nelson Mandela and the ANC could do no wrong. Norway was one of the main contributors to the ANC and one of its most vociferous supporters in international campaigns to isolate South Africa”.[2]

The reward came when Nelson Mandela and his companions were set free from political imprisonment. When Mandela himself arrived in Oslo, invited by the Norwegian Government from 17. – 19. Mai 1992, he was welcomed by a whole city, celebrating the Norwegian constitution day. His next visit to Norway to receive the Nobel Peace Prize together with de Klerk, turned into a new popular celebration. The victory of the South African people was felt as the victory of all those who had contributed to the liberation movement.

 

The Norwegian anti-apartheid movement consisted mainly of the solidarity organisations (like the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa, the Student’ and Academics’ International Solidarity Fund (SAIH) and the Namibia Association), the labour movement with the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) at the head, and the Norwegian Church. The interesting thing is that even the substantial differences between those groups of organisations, they made great efforts in co-operating for the good cause, and this made the movement strong with important impact on the political decisions. 

 

Solidarity from the bottom

Norwegian authorities were long reluctant to give official support to the liberation movements in the southern Africa. Before 1960, South African issues were hardly raised at all in the Parliaments foreign policy debates, as the main interest was cold- war issues.[3] With a few exceptions, the Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN followed a consistent policy, which was to avoid denouncing the apartheid regime, since this was seen as the best way making the regime work willingly with the UN. In practice, this made Norway, together with the other Nordic countries, abstain from voting when questions about South Africa and the race problems were raised.[4] However, being a member of the UN Security Council in 1963-1964, Norway was particularly active in drafting a resolution that called for implementation of a limited arms embargo by all UN members.

 

Students and other youth organisations were the first to debate political situation in South Africa and the neighbouring countries, and to make political statements on the South African apartheid regime. As an answer to the apartheid regime’s discriminatory racial laws in higher education in South Africa, the Norwegian National Union of Students immediately opened up for South African students to get scholarship for studies in Norway. As a result of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Albert Luthuli of the ANC the same year, the growing solidarity movement took a more organised form. The Norwegian Student Society took an initiative to form a South Africa Committee in October 1959, with the purpose of spreading information, to internationally oppose the South African government’s oppression of the African majority, to organise fund-raising campaigns for the victims of apartheid, and to explore the possibilities of a boycott of South African goods. MP’s from all political parties and other prominent people signed the invitation of membership.[5]

 

Norwegian Action Against Apartheid (NAMA) was founded in February 1963 to promote the isolation of, and sanctions against, the apartheid regime. The same year the Crisis Fund for South Africa was established as a sister organisation of the British International Defence and Aid Fund, which provided legal support for political prisoners and their families in South Africa. In this way, a public opinion was raised and a lot of activities took place that slowly started to put pressure on the Norwegian authority to adopt a stricter stand and policy towards the apartheid regime. At the same time, South Africa became gradually more isolated from the international society. 

 

In 1967, the Crisis Fund and NAMA merged into one; the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa (NOCOSA). NOCOSA was still an independent organisation, with about 20 member organisations from political- and other youth organisations. Gradually, trade unions, teachers- and student unions, as well as other organisations engaged in solidarity and international development work, joined NOCOSA, which at the most counted 40 member organisations and had 18 local branches around the country. The main aim of NOCOSA was to create public awareness and to influence Norway’s official politics towards the freedom struggle in Southern Africa. The organisation was first and foremost characterised by an activist approach, and succeeded in involving the grass root through a great number of demonstrations, information stands, so-called “Action Weeks” with focus on South Africa, exhibitions, campaigns, cultural events, participating in debates in the mass media, fund-raising on behalf of the liberation movements, and the production of pamphlets, magazines and study booklets. Broad public support was important in putting pressure on the Norwegian authorities into acting towards the apartheid regime directly or through international organisations such as the UN. NOCOSA thus represented an important contribution to the shaping of Norwegian policy towards the apartheid regime in South Africa and the liberation struggle throughout southern Africa.

 

The establishing of contacts

During the first years of NOCOSA’s existence, the activities were mostly overshadowed by other events, such as the Vietnam- war and the question of Norway’s membership in the EEC (EU). One of the important tasks of NOCOSA was to establish contacts between the liberation movements and Norwegian politicians. Representatives from the liberation movements visited Norway several times in the early 1960’s, and from 1967 NOCOSA frequently hosted the visitors and rang insistently on the doorbells of, in particularly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, political parties and trade unions. Press coverage was arranged during the visits, and NOCOSA travelled around the country with the representatives to spread information into every corner of Norway. These tours were always followed with inquiries of more information, and a local branch of NOCOSA was often founded before or after the visits.

 

Through the visits of prominent leaders of the liberation movements, such as Eduardo Mondlane, Sam Nujoma, Agostinho Neto and Amilcar Cabral, and all the other representatives, NOCOSA hoped that the so far hesitant Norwegian authorities would give more attention to their struggle for freedom. Although the representatives in the 1960s were received at the level of civil servants at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and only rarely had meetings with MPs, it’s obvious that these frequent visits and the press-coverage of them, played an important role in getting the Parliament to take the liberation struggle in Southern Africa into the foreign policy debates. The Portuguese colonies attracted most attention in this period, and especially Mozambique. The two visits of Eduardo Mondlane in 1965 and 1967, were an important factor for opening up for Norwegian support to the liberation movements. The first official Norwegian grant of NOK 200 000[6] to the liberation of Southern Africa was to FRELIMO’s Mozambique Institute in 1969. Two years later, the Parliament decided to grant NOK 700 000 to the Mozambique Institute. It was now clear that the support also went into projects in the liberated areas, not only to the Institutes work itself.[7]

 

Even if the Norwegian government had made funds available for refugees from southern Africa since 1963, it was first after the visit of Mondlane 1967, that the debate for this kind of aid really started. In 1969, the Council of the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD) was asked to prepare an extensive statement on the principles guiding Norwegian aid policies. In general, the final statement, after a heated debate, shows to some extent a radicalisation of thinking around Third World issues and development aid that had been taking place since the mid-sixties. It was clearly stated in a controversial paragraph, that support should be given to popular organisations and movements working for national and social liberation.[8] The Board of NORAD stressed however, that the new changes had to be decided by Parliament. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a Report to the Parliament (no 30 1970-71), and the Centre/Conservative government coalition accepted the recommendations, but narrowed the assistance to the liberation movements to be only of a humanitarian kind. One year later the new Labour government made a new Parliamentary Report, Report nr. 29 (1972-73) – On certain key topics relevant to Norway’s co-operation with the development countries. In this it was recommended to make available “both humanitarian and other forms of financial assistance to the peoples in dependent areas struggling to achieve national liberation”.[9] The situation in the remaining Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia and Namibia was explicitly referred to. No references were made to the apartheid regime in South Africa, which means that this country was not regarded as a dependent area. This was probably the main reason why Norway did not give assistance to ANC before in 1977.[10] Anyway, for 1973, the Parliament set aside NOK 5 mill to the liberation movements in Southern Africa, including the PAIGC. The year after, the aid to the liberation movements was increased to over NOK12 mill, this time the ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe and SWAPO of Namibia shared a part of the amount. In 1975 the budget was further raised to NOK 15 mill.[11]

 

UN/OAU conference in Oslo

In 1973, an UN/OAU conference was held in Oslo. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already in 1970 been asked to host an OAU conference to formulate a programme of action to hasten the process of decolonisation and the abolishment of apartheid in Southern Africa. The request came as an initiative from President Kenneth Kaunda. Norway was positive to this, but wanted a stronger involvement from the UN. This was also desirable for the liberation movements, to give their struggle more international legitimacy. The conference, which was the first OAU held outside the African continent, was opened by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs the 9. April 1973. In his address he committed the Norwegian support to the liberation struggle:

“The Norwegian government by hosting the conference, wanted to express once more its full support for the peoples of southern Africa who were struggling for their liberation and against apartheid.”[12]

By focusing on the liberation struggle instead of the problem of apartheid and the refugee problems, the conference made a great step forward contributing to the understanding and support for the struggle for freedom in southern Africa.[13] Background papers and speakers from the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bisseau told about the liberated areas, the recent military advances and the need for development assistance for health, education and agriculture to the people within the liberated areas. Also ANC and PAC witnessed about the growing black resistance inside South Africa, black industrial strikes and student demonstrations. Also the important role of the non-governmental organisation in disseminating information, raising fund, establishing contacts between the liberation movements and the authorities in countries in the Western world was highlighted in several papers and speaches. At the same time a lot of criticism was raised against the western governments for their role as trading partners and suppliers of arms to the apartheid regime, especially from the solidarity organisations.[14]

 

Outside the conference hall, there were a lot of activities arranged by NOCOSA and other solidarity organisations. Stands, information folders, an own public rally addressed among others by Marcelino dos Santos and Vasco Cabral, seminars at the University and other public meetings and exhibitions. A “solidarity week” was arranged all over the country. NOCOSA was not invited to the official conference, but was especially active in bringing the information and the results of the conference out to the public. Almost 300 representatives from the mass media attended the conference, so the event was well covered in the newspapers, and with daily programmes on the radio and television related to the themes of the conference.

The conference is described as a turning point, signifying an international breakthrough for the justification of the liberation movements as legitimate representatives of the peoples struggling for freedom. The importance of the conference was also referred to at the OAU Cuncil meeting in Addis Ababa in May that year and by several speakers at the UN “Special Committee of 24” in June.[15] The words of FRELIMO representative Jorge Rebelo expressed the role of the Nordic countries like this: “There is nothing strange in this – as Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland have been consistently supporting our struggle. But we consider that the new approach that they are taking – now supporting us politically and not only on a humanitarian basis is an important development”.[16] The “Programme of Action” was nevertheless a controversial statement, and important points were unacceptable to the Nordic governments, such as formulations that “support should be given to the liberation movements … to enable them to carry out their armed struggle” and formulations with the implication that NATO as an organisation supported the colonial wars.[17]

 

Increased action needed

The military coup in Portugal in 1974 and the following decolonisation of the Portuguese colonies, the South African war against Angola and the Cuban military support of the MPLA, were events that engaged the press and put the harsh suppression and the aggressive foreign policy of the apartheid regime on the political agenda, internationally as well as in Norway. SWAPO of Namiba was granted Norwegian aid from 1974, and the grants increased steadily over the next years. The Soweto upraising of 1976 that led to the disastrous massacre of schoolchildren and the famous picture of Hector Peterson carried away by his older brother, made a whole world open up their eyes to the awful situation of the black peoples of South Africa.

 

While the Norwegian Government hosted the OAU/UN-conference in 1973, the next conference in Norway on South Africa was set up by NOCOSA in Oslo in the autumn of 1977. The conference was held as a hearing, with the background in the Soweto upraising, and the increasing tension in the country. People who had suffered directly under the oppression by the apartheid regime were invited as witnesses. Representatives from ANC, SACTU, church organisations, student organisations and other anti-apartheid movements, as well as experts and other prominent persons made their statements at the hearing. Also representatives from SWAPO and the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe were present. The statements presented during the hearing, were assessed by an Investigative Commission consisting of 25 persons, with a broad representation; leaders of political parties, trade union leaders, representatives of religious and humanitarian organisations, lawyers, scholars and other persons of high reputation. The hearing was opened by the then Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund.

 

Witness’ statements on imprisonment, torture and killings made a strong impression on those assembled, and the Investigation Commission expressed its support in an official communiqué for the:

“legitimate struggle being waged in Southern Africa against apartheid and oppression. We support the international campaign to isolate the present South Africa regime. We regard the fact that South Africa is able to construct an extensive modern military machine as extremely serious. This represents a direct threat to other African states. It necessitates a compulsory weapons embargo and sanctions in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Norway must give added support to those African states subject to South African aggression. We further demand that the Norwegian government begin an official investigation into, and charting of, the military connection between members of NATO and South Africa.”[18]

Norway was the only Nordic country that had voted for this Programme of Action, and was now asked to implement the charter’s points on boycott of the South African regime.

 

With the extensive participation and broad press coverage, the hearing came to be a major event, and important in bringing Southern Africa in generally, and South Africa especially, into focus. For NOCOSA it was a turning point in their solidarity work for the Southern Africa. From still being a small Oslo-based anti-apartheid group, it became a major countrywide grassroots movement. Member organisations were drawn closer to NOCOSA’s activities, and their impact, both politically and in the public opinion, increased considerably.[19]

 

Norwegian direct support to ANC and PAC

In 1977 came finally the decision to give direct support to ANC and PAC. This was early compared to most other western countries, but late compared to Sweden, who started already in 1973. The Norwegian historian Eva Helene Østbye has pointed out a number of reasons why it came so late. Norwegian support was only to be used for humanitarian work for refugees, and the number of refugees under the care of the liberation movements was few. The need for support of refugees from South Africa in the neighbouring countries was therefore very small. Another explanation was that the Foreign Ministry had decided to follow the strategy adopted by the OAU, to attack the weakest link first, which were viewed to be the Portuguese colonies, then Zimbabwe and Namibia, and then finally the South African regime itself. An important factor was nevertheless the lack of knowledge of the liberation movements and the work they were doing, a little scepticism towards their organisation and that they were working from exile, and a generally reserved attitude among the diplomat corps.[20] In addition, as before mentioned, South Africa was not seen as a dependent area, which meant that direct official support to the liberation movements could be seen as interference with state matters.

 

On the other hand, Norway had long been a strong spokesman for increased international pressure on the apartheid regime, and had supported the humanitarian and economic support of the UN. Then came the Soweto upraising, followed by the regime’s banning of independent newspapers, trade unions, Christian and other humanitarian organisations, and all demonstrations were brutally put down. At the UN, the situation was regularly debated, and in November 1977 the UN for the first time adopted binding sanctions against a member country with an arms embargo against South Africa. Norway had already in 1976 banned currency licences and export credits, the first sanction legislation against South Africa passed by any Nordic country.[21]

 

As we have seen, the activities of the solidarity movement accelerated after the Soweto upraising. In 1976, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Union (LO) together with the labour movement as a whole launched a campaign against apartheid. The goal was both to raise public awareness and summon support for economic sanctions against the apartheid regime, and to raise funds for support to democratic forces in Southern Africa, like liberation movements, trade unions and for humanitarian assistance to refugees. The Church of Norway did support the Christian Institute in South Africa from 1973, and their involvement in the anti-apartheid work increased steadily. The Students’ and Academic’ International Assistance Fund (SAIH) supported South African refugees, primarily in the field of education, and did important information work, especially among the students. And the hearing that NOCOSA organised in 1977 came out with strong recommendations for the need of supporting the freedom struggle in South Africa. Constantly a flow of appeals was sent from this community of non-governmental organisation to Norwegian authorities to increase the support to South African liberation movements.

 

The ANC representative in Sweden, Sobizana Mngqikana, visited Oslo in November 1976, to ask for support to a project together with Sweden for help to the thousands of refugees that had fled to Tanzania after the Soweto upraising. At the meeting with the Foreign Ministry he was told that such support only could be given after a new parliamentary decision, and responded by declaring that he could not understand how Norway distinguished between the different liberation movements that excluded support to the ANC. This project was however the first to be given support from Norway, after the parliamentary decision in June 1977. [22]

 

Norwegian official support to the liberation of South Africa

Without any possibility to measure what had the most effective impact, it is clear that both the happenings in southern Africa those years in the middle of the seventies, and the increased activities of the solidarity movement, were factors that moved Norwegian authorities towards stronger support of the South African liberation movements. The liberation of the Portuguese colonies, the war in Angola and the instability in the region as a whole, not least because of the aggressive South African foreign policy were also factors that triggered the understanding of need for translating words into action. In this was also an east-west, cold war dimension. The social democracies of the Nordic countries saw it as important not to leave it to the communist countries outside Africa to be the only supporter of the liberation struggle, in fear of communist domination in the new African states.

 

In 1977 the grant to liberation movements in southern Africa was NOK 12 million, shared equally between the liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The money had to be spent for humanitarian work for refugees, except part of it that was given to the black consciousness movement inside South Africa.[23] The first years the ANC had problems with the implementation of the refugee project in Mazimbu, and the money allocated was not used as planned. This did not lead to a cut in the allocations to the ANC. The MFA just stated that the funds should be used within reasonable time. On the other hand, this led to no increase in the direct support to ANC those first years, except the money that was canalised through the Norwegian NGOs. Anyway, the links between Norway and ANC became close, and the co-operation mostly functioned well in the years to come.[24]  

 

Also the PAC received support for its humanitarian work for refugees from 1977. Because of internal strife and a weak organisation the co-operation with PAC was more complicated. It didn’t make it easier that the PAC was backed by China and ANC by the Soviet Union, and that the relationship between the two movements was not one of the best. The decision to support also the PAC, seemed to be, according to Østbye, a result of limited knowledge, positive recommendations from the Norwegian embassy in Tanzania and Norway choosing to be on the safe side by supporting both organisations that were recognised by the OAU and the UN.[25] The support for PAC was regularly considered and was maintained as the internal relations in PAC improved and the movement was doing important refugee work.[26] Its, however, evident that Norway recognised ANC as the main liberation movement. The total direct Norwegian support to ANC between 1977 and 1992 was NOK 400 500 000, while the total direct support to PAC in the same period 24 200 000.[27]

 

In total, the official support to the struggle for freedom in southern Africa between 1963 and 1992 was around NOK 1,68 billion.[28] All the time a huge share of the allocated funds were channelled through NGOs, such as the Students’ and Academic’ International Assistance Fund (SAIH), LO, Norwegian Peoples Aid, the Namibia Association, NOCOSA and as we shall see under, the Norwegian Church. Another share of the allocations were channelled through United Nations funds and the international Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF).

 

The Norwegian Church and South Africa

Its well known that the Norwegian Church was one of the main supporters of the freedom struggle in South Africa. The South African Council of Churches (SACC) became the Norwegian Church’ closest partner in the work against apartheid. The Norwegian Church is a national state church, and embraces 88% of the Norwegian population (1998). Although only 3% of the members go to church regularly, the church has a strong position in the Norwegian society and can be regarded as a non-governmental organisation.[29] The Church’ involvement in South African issues was mainly rested with the Council on Ecumenical and International Relations (CEIR). CEIR also co-operated with other Norwegian institutions and organisations working for solidarity with the freedom struggle of South Africa. Alliances were made that otherwise would seldom appear, for instance to the political Left and the Labour movement. Many church people also played an important role in the anti-apartheid movement since the early sixties. The reasons for the Churches involvement to fight apartheid can quite obviously be seen as a solidarity act with the oppressed majority of South Africa. Just as important was that the apartheid system was made with allusions to the bible, and at the same time violated the basic humanistic values that Christians all over the world recognised. This could not go on without reactions, especially not from the Christians themselves. Another important reason for the Norwegian church to take action was that English-speaking churches in South Africa asked for solidarity from the brothers and sisters in the western countries, and appeal for support came direct to the Norwegian Church.[30] During the 1960s, the Norwegian Church condemned apartheid and the sympathy for the liberation movement grew stronger, but except for support to the refugees, not much activity took place.[31] From the 1970s there was a strong wish among church leaders for concrete action. The first project to be supported was the Christian Institute, established by Beyers Naudé, with NOK 5 000, granted from the non-governmental organisation Norwegian Church Aid. In 1972 Naudé visited Norway for the first time, and he was to become the main advisor for the Norwegian Church’ support to the liberation of South Africa the next decades.[32]

 

The Christian Institute soon fell into trouble, as the Vorster government saw the Institute as an enemy of the state and in 1975, could no longer, among other things, receive funding from abroad. In 1977 the Institute and Bayers Naudé were banned, but CEIR continued to stay in close contact with the Institute. After the South African regime banned 18 organisations in October 1977, CEIR found new partners who still could work inside South Africa, among them SACC and BCM. From 1983 Diakonia and Legal Resources Centre were to become close partners of CEIR, and in 1985, CEIR in close co-operation with the Norwegian consulate in Cape Town, set up the Social Change Assistance Trust, which distributed money to a large number of grassroots organisations in the Cape Town area.[33] The leaders of CEIR had extended communication with their partners, and according to the historian Berit Hagen Agøy, it was the Norwegian organisation with:

 “..the most extensive and frequent communication with opposition groups within South Africa, and this meant a lot in the church’s co-operation with government and other non-governmental organisations, both when it came to sharing information and to political lobbying”.[34]

From 1976 to early 1980 the annual support from the Norwegian Church raised from NOK 300 000 to NOK 3 million. Except some support to ANCs work for refugees in Zambia, the Church never gave direct support to any South African liberation movement.[35]

 

Between 1975 and 1995, a total amount of NOK 250 million was channelled from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through CEIR to their partners inside South Africa and Namibia. From 1985 around ten million a year, in 1987 twenty million and between 1988 and 1990 thirty million a year.[36] Most of these money reached South Africa by ordinary bank transfers. From 1986, people from CEIR, especially secretary-generals Trond Bakkevig and Atle Sommerfeldt, started to transfer money illegally cross the border with travellers’ checks and cash. They could hide as much as NOK 100 000 each time, and totally was NOK 2 million transferred into South Africa this way. The money was handed over to Beyers Naudé, who gave it further to small committees in different areas of the country, which again gave it to people who was in urgent need for funding. It could be for escaping the country, hiding from the police or for funerals. This activity did not become known before after the change in government in South Africa.[37]

 

Consular activities

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs donated money with an unusual lack of bureaucracy. If it was the Church or another solidarity organisation, a short letter or even (a rumour tells) a telephone call could be enough, and the money was on the way. The Norwegian Consulate in Cape Town became it selves strongly involved in the anti-apartheid work. The former diplomat and Head of 1. Political Affairs Division at the Ministry of Foreign affairs, later to become Foreign Minister, commented in a radio programme in 1998, that what they did in South Africa was “on the brink of normal diplomatic activities”.[38] In 1976 the government decided that the Norwegian Consulate in Cape Town should become more involved in humanitarian work. Since the government had decided that only legal activities could be supported inside South Africa, the definition of what was legal was to be stretched. This was especially the case after 1986, when the General-consul Bjarne Lindstrøm became widely known for his more or less secret activities. And there was an unspoken agreement not to ask too many questions, nor from the Church or from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[39]

 

From 1979 the Consulate was allocated NOK 50 000, and the money could be distributed from the General-consular rather free. In the 1980s this fund was raised to NOK 100 000. In addition Bjarne Lindstrøm was active in distributing funds from CEIR to the grassroots organisations. The money went to all kind of organisations, giving people a chance to organise against the apartheid regime. In this period the process of assessing a request for funding could take only twenty minutes. Another non-diplomatic task of the Consular was from time to time to house people that the police was looking for.[40]

 

The struggle for sanctions against South Africa

An eventual boycott of South Africa was a hot political issue in Norway, especially during the middle of the 1980s. For the solidarity movement, such as NOCOSA, this was an important part of the struggle against apartheid from the beginning of the 1960s. Nobel Peace Prize Winner Albert Luthuli called for full boycott of South Africa in 1960, and this was a vital motivation for the anti-apartheid movement. The labour movement was the first in Norway to start a consumer boycott that first and foremost banned import of fruit, vegetables, wine and brandy from South Africa in 1960. The boycott was initiated in 1959 by ICTFU, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and the effect in Norway was remarkable as the import decreased from NOK 10,7 million in 1959 till NOK 0,5 million in 1960. In 1963, a new and broad consumer boycott was started by the political youth parties, after a request from the World Assembly of Youth the same year. In 1976, the LO again launched a broad campaign against apartheid, with among other the objective to summon support for stronger economic sanctions against South Africa. From the middle of the 1970s, NOCOSA together with student organisations, the Socialist Left Youth and local activist organisations regularly held actions and demonstrations for boycott. Actions against groceries and other shops that sold products from South Africa was frequent, and especially after the Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu in 1984 urged for total isolation of the apartheid regime.[41]

 

Through lots of activities and information work, the public opinion became well aware of what this was all about. When NOCOSA in 1979 asked for municipal boycotts of South Africa, the time was perhaps not yet mature. Only a few municipal councils, among them Oslo, said yes to the principles of boycott that NOCOSA put forward, which said that they were not to have any trade relations or other communication with South Africa. When a new effort was made for a municipal boycott in 1985, nearly 80% of the municipalities made the decision to isolate South Africa. The sports- and cultural boycott was almost total in Norway, and especially Norwegian artists did a lot of work to support the liberation movements. In 1986 NOCOSA launched a boycott of Shell in Norway, which attracted wide attention and raised the debate to new heights. Shell called the action political terrorism, but soon 475 owners of the 600 Shell stations in Norway had made a petition to Shell International with protests against the mother company’s activities in South Africa. Later NOCOSA extended the action also to BP, Total, Mobil, Chevron and Texaco.[42]

 

NOCOSA also worked extensively towards the labour movement to get the industry to stop all import and export on South Africa, and to get support for the demand for total boycott from Norwegian authorities. The labour movement was to a great extent involved in support of the anti-apartheid work, with support to liberation movements, labour organisations and refugees in South Africa. But the Labour Organisation had not yet made the demand to implement total boycott of the apartheid regime, even if the LO provided an important channel for exercising political influence. The diverting approach to different liberation- and labour movements of South Africa made the relationship between the two organisations somewhat strained for a long time. NOCOSA nevertheless had close relations to many of the branches within the labour movement, and the support for the demand of boycott grew stronger towards the middle of the eighties.[43]

 

The main argument against boycott was that it would be worthless if Norway was the only country to implement this policy, and in the same time Norwegian jobs and industry could be at risk. For the boycott supporters the most important arguments were that the liberation movements themselves had repeatedly called for boycott and had faith in this as an effective mean in the struggle for freedom. But in Norway, as in the rest of the world, economic interest was often the weightiest consideration. Not only when it came to Norwegian industry and working places, but also in particular the freight of oil on Norwegian tankers to South Africa. Together with the Dutch organisation Shipping Research Bureau (SRB), NOCOSA documented in a report in 1986 that Norwegian Ships and owner interests were involved in 51 of 83 oil shipments to South Africa. SRB had earlier also documented that oil from the Norwegian North Sea had found its way to South Africa. The Norwegian Shipowners Association had a strong lobby impact on the Parliament, and together with the industry interests, boycott legislation was a very difficult way to go in Norwegian policy.[44]

 

Nevertheless, the endless pressure from NOCOSA, the Church, Members of Parliament, labour organisations and other solidarity organisations, was undoubtedly a contributing factor that made the government put forward a proposal for boycott legislation in 1986. A majority of the MPs were positive, and one year after the legislation was enacted, in February 1987. This came about the same time as in the other Nordic countries. Only transport of crude oil was prohibited, while transport of refined oil products and other goods were left out. Hence, the Norwegian shipping interests mainly could sail uninterrupted. Norway was nevertheless the first large shipping nation, which forbid freight of crude oil to South Africa. It was also made exceptions for import of manganese and other minerals that were crucial for the Norwegian industry.[45]

 

Conclusion

The history of the solidarity work from Norway with the liberation struggle in Southern Africa is not easy to summarize in a few pages. For those who are interested, the whole story can be read in Tore Linné Eriksen (red): Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa, which was published in 2000. The book is one of many in the project initiated by the Nordic Africa Institute, to document the involvement of the Nordic countries in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.

 

The support from the Nordic countries should not only be weighed in money. Probably the most important was the political and moral support for the liberation struggle against apartheid, the activism of a whole people who wanted to do its outmost to help, and official statements from Parliament that clearly condemned the apartheid system and, although it took some time, supported the liberation movement. As a member of NATO, it was not obvious that Norway should take this stand, since the majority of the liberation movements were recognised by the Soviet Union and got their arms either from there or from other Warszawa-pact countries. Official policy in most western countries did not go that far at all. That’s why the support from the Nordic countries was so important, to take their struggle out of the cold-war/east-west conflict, not to be associated with communist influence and to give their struggle legitimacy in the western world through support from the social-democratic Nordic countries. Sweden took the lead in making contact with and supporting the liberation movements. Norway was a bit more reluctant, and up to 1969, when FRELIMO was allocated funding for their Mozambique Institute, only official support to refugees from Southern Africa was given. The Parliamentary Report of 1972/73 opened up for direct support to liberation movement’s humanitarian work in dependent areas. However, the liberation movements of South Africa did not get support before 1977, partly because the country was not seen as a dependent area, partly because of insecurity about the role and the work of the liberation movements.

 

Anyhow, from what the Norwegian historian and author Tore Linné Eriksen has described as the “silent” 1950s, happenings inside southern Africa attracted more attention and political considerations in the 1960s. The Sharpeville Massacre, the Nobel Peace Prize to Albert Luthuli, the banning of ANC and the detention of Nelson Mandela and other political leaders, and not at least, the independence achieved by the other African states draw attention to the remaining dependent states in Southern Africa and the apartheid regime in South Africa. The role of representatives from the liberation movements was perhaps the most important contribution to the growing support. With frequent visits to Norway and the other Nordic countries, they saw to that the politicians, and the public through the media, did not get away with indifference. Through meetings, often arranged by NOCOSA, with political parties, trade unions, the Church and youth organisations, important relations were built and sympathy for their struggle grew strong. The Norwegian history as a non-colonialist state, the values of the social democracy system and the Christian ethics and norms, can also be taken into account for the Norwegian support, together with early and close contact developed between Norway and Julius Nyerere in Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda in Kenya. The solidarity movement, with the strong alliance between the grassroots organisations, the Church and the Labour movement, had an important impact on the political scene when it came to convert words into action. And again, what happened in South Africa triggered reactions in Norway. The Soweto upraising was particularly provoking, and drew a great deal of attention to the conditions of apartheid. The Nobel Peace Prize Award to Bishop Desmond Tutu 1984 was another highlight, which called forth intensified sympathy for the liberation struggle and inspiration for the demands for a Norwegian boycott law. The harshening of the apartheid oppression, the state of emergency, and the intensification of the liberation struggle from the middle of the 1980s were met with a lot of activism by the Norwegian anti-apartheid movement and increased official funding. In the end, we should not forget the individual commitment that was an important factor in achieving results. 

Although the official Norwegian support to the liberation movements was guided by principles that this support was given only as humanitarian assistance, (which by the way was criticised by solidarity organisations such as NOCOSA and SAIH, who wanted the support to be given unconditional) several leaders of the liberation movements have stated that the support was seen as political as much as humanitarian. The money that went to the refugee camps for shelter, food, clothes and education, would support the people who also were making themselves ready to make a contribution towards the liberation. As stated by the prominent SWAPO leader Peter Katjavivi:

“The idea of being in a refugee camp was not to settle there indefinitely. It was an opportunity to regroup and acquire the necessary skills and competence while we were in exile. It became a training camp, where you acquired skills that might be needed in an independent Namibia. I think that consideration was well understood by the Norwegian countries”.[46]

The money channelled in to South Africa and Namibia via NGOs like SAIH, Norwegian Peoples aid, LO, the Namibia Association and CEIR helped keeping life in, and building up, an anti-apartheid movement that managed to work in spite of the persecution from the apartheid regime. 

 

In the end, I would like to emphasize a last point, which is stated as important by several leaders of the liberation movements. The support was regarded as solidarity and not as charity. The overthrow of the apartheid regime became common interest, and thus the supporters and the liberation movement came to be partners in the struggle.[47]

 

Bibliography

Agøy, Berit Hagen, 2000: “The freedom Struggle in Southern Africa: The Role of the Norwegian Churches 1948 – 1994”, in Eriksen (ed.) 2000, Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Nordiska Afrikainstituttet, Uppsala.

Drolsum, Nina, 1999: For et fritt Afrika, Fellesrådet for Afrika 1967 – 2000, Solidaritet Forlag, Oslo

Drolsum, Nina, 2000, “The Norwegian Council for Southern Africa (NOCOSA): A Study in Solidarity and Activism”, in Eriksen 2000 (ed.): Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Nordiska Afrikainstituttet, Uppsala.

Eriksen, Tore Linné, 2000: “The Origins of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa 1960 – 1975”, in Eriksen 2000 (ed.): Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Nordiska Afrikainstituttet, Uppsala.

Eriksen, Tore Linné, 2000: “An Ambigous Champion: Some Concluding Remarks”, in Eriksen 2000 (ed.): Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Nordiska Afrikainstituttet, Uppsala.

De Klerk, F.W., 1999: The Last Trek – A New Beginning. The Autobiography. London, Macmillan.