Finnish solidarity with South Africa: A Unique Case
By Timo-Erkki Heino
South Africa policy was - and has remained
- sui generis, the only one of its kind in the field of Finnish foreign
policy. The few pressure groups who ever considered affecting Finnish
foreign policy have generally failed to achieve anything more than marginal
impact. Through the years those who direct Finnish foreign policy have been
able to do so quite unaffected by outside influence. However, with one
exception: in South Africa policy non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
solidarity actions had an outstanding effect on the formation of the policy.
Major shifts in Finland’s South Africa
policy occurred in 1966 and 1973, and culminated in the imposition of sanctions
in 1987. All of these changes were expressly preceded by NGO action.
Finland’s South Africa policy was developed
through the interaction of two major groups.
On one hand, there were the Foreign
Ministry including the directors of foreign policy and officials who implement
policy, and the representatives of Finland’s export industries. On the other
hand, there were the NGOs comprising of solidarity groups, trade unions, the
Lutheran Church, and political parties.
Through the years when apartheid was
the issue, the objective of the Foreign Ministry was to maintain political
and economic relations with the Republic of South Africa. The objective of the
NGOs was to severe or break off these relations to show solidarity to the
victims of apartheid or through sanctions expedite political change in
South Africa.
The Foreign Ministry’s objectives for
economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa were publicly justified in
the principles of the UN Charter and in the principle of foreign policy free of
moral stands. However, the most important explanation was Finland’s special
relations with the Soviet Union. According to this argument, if Finland were
to take a moral stand against a given Western country, Finland would sooner or
later be called on to take a moral stand against the Soviet Union. Yet, this
was seen to be contrary to the country’s most vital national security
interests. Therefore: no moral stand against any country.
In South Africa policy initiatives for
stands and actions were originated by the NGOs. They then found their way into
the political agenda through youth and students’ organizations of various
political parties. The parties themselves then brought the initiatives into
parliamentary discussion and – if passed - from Parliament to be implemented as
part of foreign policy. The Parliament and political parties acted as due intermediaries
between NGOs and the Government and the Foreign Ministry.
However, in accordance with the
Constitution of the time, Parliament’s decisions were only to be considered as
recommendations since final executive powers in foreign policy rested with the
President who had the Foreign Ministry at his disposal.
The South Africa policy is also an example
of how NGO pressure and democratic decision making process can be contained.
Each NGO action was met with a resistance from the Foreign Ministry, and
persistently contained by the Foreign Ministry. When an NGO position was
recognized for instance by decisions taken in the Parliament, the Ministry
almost always found ways to co-opt or nullify the position.
Three types of NGOs played the major role
on the South African issue: the Lutheran Church, the trade-union movement and
anti-apartheid pressure groups.
Finland’s Lutheran missionaries working in
Ovamboland and Namibia had long had first-hand experience of life under apartheid.
By the mid-1960s missionary workers were beginning to sympathize with Namibian
opposition to the South African regime. However, the church was rather
reluctant to campaign on a large scale against the South African government,
because public campaigns were thought to put the missionary activities in
Namibia at risk. It was not until the mid‑1980s that the church began to
campaign against apartheid.
The first NGOs in Finland to actually instigate
public action against South Africa were trade unions. The Finnish Seamen’s
Union and the Transport Workers’ Union acted with boycotts against South
African goods in the early 1960s and, again, in the mid‑1980s.
The anti-apartheid pressure groups
in Finland were usually formed in reaction to incidents in South Africa and out
of dissatisfaction with the Finnish Government’s subsequent stands on the apartheid issue. In many cases they were modeled after corresponding groups in the other
Nordic countries.
The student South Africa Committee was
established in 1965 out of dissatisfaction with Finland’s behavior in the UN.
In 1971 the Africa Committee was established with the specific mission to get
official development aid extended to liberation movements in Southern Africa.
The ”Isolate South Africa Campaign” was established in 1983 to lobby for the
imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa.
One significant feature in NGO action was
that once the pressure group succeeded in reaching its particular goal, its
activities usually subsided quickly.
1960-1966: In the shadow of Sharpeville
The Sharpeville shootings in March 1960
shocked the world and aroused solidarity actions throughout the world, even in
Finland, if a little belatedly.
In 1963, Finnish NGO activity on the South
African question awakened for the first time. In October 1963 the Federation of
the Transport Workers’ Unions (Kuljetusalan Ammattiliittojen Federationi) and
its major member union, the Finnish Seamen’s Union (Merimies-Unioni), headed by
the legendary trade union leader, Niilo Wälläri, started a boycott of South
African ships and goods in Finnish harbors. The boycott had been inspired on
the initiatives by the international trade union-movement and by the National
Union of Finnish Students (Suomen ylioppilaskuntien liitto).
However, the boycott was called off
practically before it started. Only one ship, the Swedish-registered m/s
Vingaren was actually boycotted. The boycott decision was reversed when the
Department for External Economic Relations of the Foreign Ministry and the
Finnish Foreign Trade Association drew attention on the difficulties the
boycott would bring for the export industry and its workers. According to
Wälläri, however, the boycott had been a warning to importers to reduce
imports from South Africa.
At the UN General Assembly in 1965 the
South African question was placed on the agenda once again. As on earlier
occasions Finland abstained while 80 countries, including Sweden and Denmark,
voted for the resolution condemning the South African government.
Finland’s reason for abstaining was that
the determination of a threat to international peace and security, as well as
sanctions, were only within the competence of the Security Council, not the
General Assembly.
This time Finland’s abstaining stance
received strong criticism at home. The newspaper Suomen Sosialidemokraatti,
a media organ of the social democrats, who were in opposition at the time,
reacted with an editorial entitled ”White Finland’s Line” which asserted:
Little white Finland is now courting South
Africa’s favor in order to save its commercial interests and business
relations with the white minority rulers of that country. In our view this
constitutes a great shame, but that shame rests only with the bourgeoisie of
our country and the infamous Government.
Boycotting Lumumba
The criticism was followed by the first
serious - and successful - attempt by the Finnish NGOs to influence the Finnish
South Africa policy. In January 1966 the boycott on South African goods was
reactivated by Niilo Wälläri and the Federation of Transport Workers’ Unions.
This time the boycott was directed specifically at alcoholic beverages of
South African origin. The boycott forced Finland‘s state-owned alcohol monopoly,
Alko, to cancel its orders from South Africa.
To direct the boycott against a state-owned
enterprise was an effort to directly influence the Government’s South Africa
policy. In an official letter to the Government, the trade unions demanded that
Finland join the overwhelming UN majority calling for sanctions against
South Africa. It went on to request that state agencies and state-owned
companies refrain from South African imports.
Following international models the South
Africa Committee (Etelä-Afrikka toimikunta) was established in 1965. The
committee was supported mainly by student organizations, but cooperated with
the Lutheran Church and trade unions as well. The student organizations of all
the major political parties participated in the Committee at the time when the
political parties themselves were deeply divided as to what stand should be
taken on the South African issue.
In November 1966, about a month before the
South African question was to be again on the agenda of the UN General
Assembly, the South Africa Committee organized an ”Anti-apartheid Week”.
The objective of the week was to inform the public on racial discrimination in
Southern Africa in order to get Finland and the Finns to oppose apartheid.
The most important factor to influence
Finland’s official position on the South African question was the election
victory of the left-wing parties in 1966, which resulted in the formation of a
”popular front” Government of the Left and Centre parties. The new social
democratic Prime Minister, Rafael Paasio, stated in his UN Day speech:
The alarming developments in South Africa
have publicly been called to our attention in recent months in a way which
shows that citizen interest has increased. A kind of ”international awakening”
has clearly taken place, especially among the Finnish youth.
In December 1966 at the UN General Assembly
the resolution on the South African question was adopted by a vote of 84 in
favor, 2 against, and 13 abstaining. This time all Nordic countries, including
Finland, voted for the resolution.
With the change in the Finnish voting
pattern, NGO interest in the South African issue was reduced – at least
temporarily.
If among the NGOs was anticipated that
voting for the resolution would also mean that Finland would take steps to
actually curtail the economic relations with South Africa, that was not to be
the case. The fact that the Finnish delegation voted for the resolution did
not mean any change in Finland’s actual policy vis-à-vis the South African
government and economic sanctions. The change was formal, a step towards a
more flexible interpretation of the UN Charter and the resolutions in
question. Earlier the Finnish delegation had expressed its support to the
resolutions in its addresses to the General Assembly while abstaining from voting
for reasons concerning the competence of the General Assembly. Now Finland
showed its support by voting for the resolutions and expressed reservations
in the addresses.
The position shift to condemn South Africa
at the UN was brought about by the student South Africa Committee, trade union
action, and an electoral victory of left-wing parties. However, the
condemnation at the UN in no way affected actual trade and diplomatic relations
between Finland and South Africa, as was understood and emphasized at the
Foreign Ministry.
The transport workers’ boycott of
alcoholic beverages did last even after 1966, although the Central Association
of the Finnish Woodworking Industries, the Department for External Economic
Relations of the Foreign Ministry, and the director general of Alko tried, on
several occasions, to persuade transport workers to abandon the boycott. The
South African ambassador to Helsinki did likewise, by ”almost by toadying up
to” the union and by ”threatening to take counter-measures.” But to no avail.
Wälläri did not yield.
In August 1967, Niilo Wälläri, the driving
force behind the boycott, died. His successors were more willing to rethink the
boycott strategy.
Partly on the basis of persuasive arguments
– trade with South Africa benefits also Finnish seamen – by the Finnish
business community, and partly out of weariness with the boycott, the Federation
of the Transport Workers’ Unions very discreetly called off the boycott of
South African alcoholic beverages in 1970.
In a significant move, Finland did announce
in 1966 that it intended to contribute to the UN Trust Fund for South Africa,
and actually made a US$ 10,000 contribution in 1968.
However, it would take seven years – and a
lot of NGO action - before Finland was prepared to give direct humanitarian
aid to the liberation movements in Southern Africa.
1967-1976: The Little League vs. The Gang of Doctors
From 1966 to 1970 domestic political
underpinning of foreign policy was formed by the left-wing majority in
Parliament and the ”popular front” Government, in which the social democrats
and communists participated after long periods of parliamentary opposition.
A move towards more active foreign policy
was advocated by the younger generation. Many of them were interested in Third
World problems and held leftist views of the student radicalism of the 1960s.
According to them Finland’s foreign policy should be open to discussion,
leftist in its analyses and approaches, and more active policy for peace.
Consequently, the late 1960s witnessed the
most intense debate on foreign policy in Finland so far. On one side were the
Foreign Ministry’s top officials, President Kekkonen’s close foreign
political confidants and aides with centrist or conservative views. Their
opponents of the younger generation, primarily social democratically oriented
individuals at the beginning of their academic or political careers, labeled
these officials as the ”Gang of Doctors” (”tohtorikopla”) or ”colonels’ junta”
(”everstijuntta”). The media labeled the young adversaries as ”The Little
League” (”nappulaliiga”).
The debate shifted even more towards Third
World with the establishing of a special NGO association and publishing house
called Tricont - as in Tricontinental - in 1968. Tricont turned out to be a
hotbed of ideas, debate and actions against colonialism and imperialism as well
as for national liberation movements in Third World.
South Africa in Parliament
From 1960 to 1966 the South Africa question
was handled only twice in Parliament. From 1967 to 1978 the question was
treated on 27 occasions. In 1971, 1973 and 1978 relations with South Africa
appeared on Parliament’s agenda four times each year. Throughout the 1970s
debate focused on diplomatic relations. Concerns about economic relations
remained rather limited. Partly this was due to the debate between ”The
Little League” and the ”Gang of Doctors”, which centered around the objectives
of the foreign policy and on the actions of the Foreign Ministry.
The initiatives in Parliament highlighted
the importance given to the South African question but did not yield in any
concrete results except in only one area: sports.
The sports connection
At the 1971 UN General Assembly, all Nordic
countries voted for the resolution calling upon member states to refrain from
sports contacts with South Africa. However, certain Finnish sports
organizations continued to maintain contacts with South Africa and even participated
in a sporting event in Pretoria.
In 1973 in Parliament attention was drawn
to the fact that sports contacts still continued. Special weight was given to
the matter by the fact that the written question was signed by MPs from all
parties represented in Parliament.
Minister of Education, responsible for
sport affairs, replied to Parliament that participation in the sporting event
had been a mistake. The reoccurrence of such incidents should be avoided by all
possible means in the future. The minister emphasized that the financial
support given to the organizations by the state constituted effective means to
direct sports organizations’ conduct. The state was in a position to withhold
the support if the need should arise.
After this initiative by the political
parties, sports contacts with South Africa - apart from professional sports
such as car racing and tennis - were discontinued. Sports contacts were the
sphere where Finland effectively applied extensive sanctions against South
Africa. This was possible due to the marginal significance of the contacts.
Aid to liberation movements
Financial assistance to liberation
movements was initiated as a voluntary activity by NGOs, taken up by the
political parties and, finally, ended up as official measures taken by the
Government and the Foreign Ministry.
The first significant assistance project
was ”Operation One Day’s Work” (Taksvärkki) organized in 1969 by the Union of
the Secondary School Students (Teiniliitto) to collect educational materials
for the liberated areas in Mozambique. This fund-raiser was repeated in 1971.
The collections brought in about US$ 110,000 and about US$ 180,000
respectively.
A rather vivid public debate on the principle
of assisting liberation movements took place in connection with these
fund-raisers.
The political parties followed the example
of the students’ organizations. In 1970 the Social Democratic Party established
the International Solidarity Foundation, which donated about US$ 1,500 to
SWAPO the following year.
In 1970 the Africa Committee
(Afrikkakomitea) was established in connection with the Finnish Peace
Committee, Finnish arm of the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council. The first
objective of the Africa Committee was the extension of direct official Finnish
development aid to the liberation movements.
On the initiative of the Africa Committee
an open letter was addressed to the Foreign Ministry in autumn 1972. The letter
proposed that the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies should be
included in Finland’s bilateral humanitarian development assistance. The proposal
carried particularly strong emphasis because it was signed by all the political
parties represented in Parliament.
Foreign Ministry officials - more or less
following the ”Gang of Doctors”-line - opposed aid to liberation movements
because there seemed to be a contradiction in giving aid to liberation
movements while simultaneously maintaining diplomatic relations with the
governments the liberation movements were opposing.
To speed up the process an ad hoc working group was established in the Foreign Ministry in December 1972 to
examine the liberation aid question. In contrast to normal procedure, the
working group was mostly composed of experts from outside the Foreign Ministry
representing the Government parties.
The working group quickly came to
conclusions that differed with the policy at the Foreign Ministry. Following
the example of Sweden, which gave aid to liberation movements while maintaining
diplomatic relations with the governments the movements opposed, and
considering the human rights principles of the UN Charter, the working group
saw no barrier to giving direct official humanitarian aid to liberation
movements.
Accordingly in 1973 the Finnish Government
started humanitarian aid to the liberation movements recognized by the OAU. At
first aid went to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, later,
in 1974 to SWAPO of Namibia and finally, in 1978 to the ANC of South Africa.
Finland’s official aid to liberation
movements was initiated by NGO fund-raisers and by actions of the Africa
Committee. However, the Foreign Ministry did start humanitarian assistance to
Southern African liberation movements first after the Ministry had become
convinced that such aid had no effect on Finland’s ongoing diplomatic relations
with governments those liberation movements were opposing.
Already in 1969 a broad spectrum of public
figures had for the first time demanded the Finnish Government to break off
diplomatic and trade relations with South Africa.
The decade-long debate culminated in 1976,
heightened by uprisings in Soweto in June that year. In October Parliament
almost unanimously required the Government to study the tightening of the
sanctions policy.
However, the Foreign Ministry succeeded in
containing this decade-long debate on ending relations with South Africa. By
sharply raising the tone of Finnish criticism of South Africa at the UN the
Foreign Ministry was able to portray Finnish foreign policy as strongly
committed to an anti-apartheid course. At the same time the Foreign
Ministry tied Finnish sanctions even more tightly than before to the binding
resolution of the UN Security Council, a policy shift which went unnoticed
by most of the Finnish public. The Ministry fully expected that the veto powers
of Great Britain and the US would effectively obstruct any future UN action on
the issue.
By the late 1970s public and parliamentary
interest turned away from problems related to the Third World, underdevelopment,
and racial discrimination. The foremost members of ”The Little League” were
grafted into the Foreign Ministry.
1983-1987: Increase economic and political pressure
In autumn of 1984 pressure for change in
South Africa began to mount again. Images of the South African police beating
black people with sjamboks were broadcast and printed all over the world
and aroused the outrage of the entire international community.
In Finland NGOs mobilized their forces and
joined with the political parties in Parliament to pressure the Finnish Government
to take action on the South African issue.
A new pressure group, the ”Isolate South
Africa Campaign” (Eristäkää Etelä-Afrikka kampanja, EELAK), had been
established already in 1983 modelled after a similar Swedish organization,
ISAK, founded in 1979. As an umbrella organization EELAK coordinated the
activities of various NGOs, including the trade unions and the Lutheran Church.
EELAK operations took off with the aggravated situation in South Africa and
became the new focal point for NGO efforts.
EELAK’s first major campaign was to
circulate a petition demanding the breaking off of economic relations with
South Africa. The petition, signed by 26.000 Finns, was delivered to the
Foreign Ministry in May 1985. Many church congregations had been active in
collecting signatures for the petition.
Based on the NGO pressure Parliament took
up the South African question again. In 1984 relations with South Africa had
been treated routinely in Parliament on four occasions. In 1985 the question
was handled on 14 occasions. NGOs and Parliament took the initiative in
Finnish South Africa policy by pushing the Foreign Ministry to move on the
matter.
The leaders of Finnish foreign policy
continued to take a cautious and reserved stand on the South African issue.
Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen - Centre, President Kekkonen’s former protégé and a junior version of the ”Gang of Doctors” - stated unequivocally in April
1985 that Finland will engage in economic sanctions only on the binding
decision by the UN Security Council.
However, with increasing domestic pressure
from Parliament and the NGOs, the Finnish Foreign Ministry finally reacted,
at first with voluntary measures, such as negotiations with the business community,
then with Government-level decisions, after that with legislative measures on
relatively minor aspects of South Africa relations and, finally, with the
official trade embargo.
In February 1985 Sweden tightened its 1979
law restricting new investment in South Africa. Denmark did likewise in June
1985, and later withdrew its consular envoy from Pretoria. Norway started to
license all imports from South Africa in August 1985. To bring Finland into
line with the other Nordic countries, the Foreign Ministry in August 1985
started to prepare a law prohibiting Finnish investments in South Africa. For
the time being no Finnish investments in South Africa did exist nor were they
planned.
In his speech on Namibia Day in August 1985
the Lutheran Archbishop of Finland, John Vikström, accused the Finnish
Government of hypocrisy and inactivity on the South African issue when it
restricted its ”actions only to forbid things that nobody had actually done”. Since a vast
majority of Finns are - at least nominally - Lutheran, the Foreign Ministry
had to give serious consideration to the church’s critique of Finland’s official
South Africa policy. The church’s provoking divergence from official foreign
policy led to informal discussions between Foreign Minister Väyrynen and the
church leaders.
The debate concerning the role of morality
in foreign policy continued in the autumn when the Archbishop and the Church
Council for Foreign Affairs (Kirkon ulkomaanasiain neuvosto) proposed that the
Government implement a trade embargo against South Africa. A simultaneous
appeal by the Lutheran Church to 60 Finnish companies to end trade with South
Africa failed to generate a big response. In a typical reaction, Fredrik
Castrén, CEO of the Kymmene Corporation, replied:
”I don’t regard the Church as any sort of a
negotiation partner in these matters”.
Something more can be done
Finally in October 1985 the NGOs took
decisive action on economic relations between Finland and South Africa. On 20
October 1985 the Finnish Transport Workers’ Union (Auto- ja Kuljetusalan
Työntekijäliitto, AKT) in a highly unexpected move started its boycott of
goods being shipped to and from South Africa. The boycott effectively stopped
all direct trade between Finland and South Africa.
Risto Kuisma, chairman of the Transport
Workers’ Union, known to be a somewhat loose cannon in the trade
union-movement, however, whose input was crucial for the implementation of the
boycott, argued for the action:
“International solidarity has been mentioned
in the trade unions’ programs for a hundred years. If it is written in the
program, then something also should be done. One cannot simply write manifestos
against the South African government knowing all the time that something more
could be done”.
The action taken by the Transport Workers’
Union was supported by the Central Organization of the Finnish Trade Unions
(Suomen Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö, SAK). The Central Organization
regretted that the measures by the Government to stop the trade had been so
slow. Other trade unions joined the transport workers in actions against
South Africa. Even postal traffic between Finland and South Africa was cut
off for a fortnight in November 1985 by the boycott of the Postal Workers’
Union. The action of the Finnish transport workers received even international
attention.
The Finnish Government had mixed feelings
about the boycott. The social democratic ministers favored the boycott
reflecting the advantage gained by letting the trade boycott be carried out by
the trade unions. Finland could be seen as taking action even though the Government
itself was absolved of any responsibility for the action and therefore the
Government could then not be taken to task for violation of international
agreements.
The Centre party ministers were explicitly
against the boycott. Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen stated in Parliament:
“If these boycotts continue, they are going to
worsen the employment situation and cause losses to very many workers and their
families...These boycotts will have no effect on the Republic of South Africa,
if the example is not followed by the trade unions in other countries...This
well-intentioned effort seems unfortunately to have come to nothing”.
After the trade had been stopped in
practice, and based of the renewed Nordic programme of action approved in
October 1985, the Finnish Government in November 1985 introduced to Parliament
the Act on Certain Measures Directed at South Africa. The act banned
economic transactions, investments as well as loans and guarantees to South
Africa, which were either non-existent or of marginal importance. Trade was not
included in the act.
All direct trade between Finland and South
Africa had been effectively stopped by the transport workers’ boycott. However,
indirect trade via third countries did continue. In June 1986 the Government
officially appealed to the organizations representing business community to
urge their member enterprises to immediately terminate all direct and indirect
trade with South Africa. The measure was preceded by the threat by the
Transport Workers’ Union to widen their boycott to include all the exports of
the companies found to continue their export indirectly to South Africa.
The US Congress decided in October in 1986
on limited trade sanctions against South Africa. Laws prohibiting trade with
South Africa went into effect in Denmark in December 1986 and in Norway in
March 1987. In March 1987 the Swedish Government introduced a similar bill in
its parliament. At the meeting of the Nordic Foreign Ministers in March 1987
it was stated that a Nordic trade boycott would soon become a reality.
Finland, as the last of the Nordic countries, introduced official boycott
legislation in May 1987.
Technically, the act was an amendment to
the previous South Africa act. The new act prohibited all export of goods from
Finland to South Africa and Namibia, and all import to Finland of goods
originating from South Africa or Namibia.
After the passage of the 1987 South Africa
Act, the interest of Finnish NGOs and Parliament focused on indirect trade between
Finland and South Africa. The Finnish Government adhered to the strictly formal
interpretation of the law. Even in cases where indirect trade had obviously
occurred, no measures were taken as the letter of the law had not been formally
violated.
Boycotts against a given country, company
or products are not uncommon practice in the international trade union
movement. Boycott actions tend to be limited, short-lived and, at best, to have
a very limited influence. In this respect, the South African trade boycott by
the Finnish Transport Workers’ Union was very exceptional even by international
standards. The action taken by the transport workers lasted long, achieved its
goal and was able to change the course of Finland’s foreign policy.
Surprising change
In South Africa things started to change.
In February 1990 President F.W. de Klerk in surprise move announced the
unbanning of the ANC and other organizations and the release of Nelson Mandela
and the repeal of the main apartheid laws by mid-1991. Further, Namibia,
the focus of Finnish missionary activity, gained independence on 21 March
1990—an extremely important event from the Finnish point of view.
Finland was quick - quicker than other
Nordic countries – to react to the changed circumstances in South Africa. In a
surprisingly swift move the Finnish Government decided on 27 June to lift trade
sanctions against South Africa. The decision went into effect on 1 July 1991.
A legal technicality made it permissible to
lift the trade embargo simply with a decision in the Government. This avoided
having to handle the matter in Parliament. The opportunity was utilized by
Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen and the Government.
The public discussion that followed the
ending of the trade embargo was far less intense than the pre-sanctions debate.
MPs from the Left-Wing Alliance (former People’s Democrats) and the Greens
expressed their opposition to the decision. The Church Council for Foreign Affairs
voiced its opinion that sanctions should have been lifted only when the changes
in South Africa were irreversible. The Central Organization of the Finnish
Trade Unions and the Transport Workers’ Union, stated that trade unions’
boycott would continue regardless of the Government’s decision.
Risto Kuisma, Chairman of the Transport
Workers’ Union, stated that the boycott would only be ended when South African
trade unions and black opposition organizations let it be known that sanctions
were no longer needed. Accordingly, the transport workers ended their boycott in February
1992 on the basis of the positive developments in South Africa.
25 years of solidarity
Official Finnish South Africa policy was
influenced by the positions of other UN member states and, most importantly,
by the views of the other Nordic countries. Actual policy shifts, however,
stemmed from NGO action.
The Foreign Ministry sought to avoid
concrete legislative action as long as possible. In the mid-1980s the Foreign
Ministry at first proceeded with measures of a voluntary nature. These included
appeals to the business community and decisions by the Government to cease transactions
which, even by the Government’s own admission, were either non-existent or
sporadic in nature.
However, with the persistence of the NGOs
and the effectiveness of the trade union action, started already in 1963,
Finland in 1987 had to follow the examples of the other Nordic countries,
influenced by their own NGOs, and terminate trade with South Africa by law.
As his personal motivation to act on the
South African issue Risto Kuisma, Chairman of the Transport Workers’ Union,
cited André Brink:
”There are two types of lunacy: firstly that
you think you can do everything and secondly that you think that you cannot do
anything”.
Sources
Archives
Information Center of the Church
Arkkipiispa Vikströmin puhe [Archbishop
Vikström’s speech], “Suomen moraalista on kysymys” [It is a question of
Finland’s morals], 26 August 1985
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Lehdistötiedote [press release], 3 April
1973
Published Original Sources
Muistio Portugalin siirtomaista [Memorandum
on the Portuguese colonies], Tricont no. 7/1972
SK, Suomen Säädöskokoelma [Code of
Decrees of Finland] 1985, 1987, 1991. Helsinki 1986, 1988, 1991
ULA, Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja
asiakirjoja [Statements and documents on foreign policy] 1966. Helsinki
Ulkoasiainministeriö [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 1967
VP ak, Valtiopäivien asiakirjat [Parliamentary documents] 1973, 1985. Helsinki 1974, 1986
VP pk, Valtiopäivien pöytäkirjat [Parliamentary
records] 1976. Helsinki 1977.
Newspapers And Periodicals
Helsingin Sanomat, Helsinki
Iltalehti, Helsinki
Merimies, Helsinki
Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, Helsinki
Uusi Suomi, Helsinki
Ylioppilaslehti, Helsinki
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